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THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND CARRY ARMS
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW:
PRESERVING LIBERTY AND KEEPING
THE PEACE
SAUL CORNELL*
I
INTRODUCTION
On the final day of its 2008 term, a sharply divided United States Supreme
Court issued a five to four decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.1 Reversing
almost seventy years of settled precedent that linked the meaning of the “right of
the people to keep and bear arms” with the preservation of a “well-regulated
militia,”2 Heller interpreted the Second Amendment as an individual right to
possess a weapon for self-defense outside of the context of service in a wellregulated militia.3 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion surveyed a broad range of
historical materials,4 but it approached the past as if it were static, when in fact
Anglo-American history in this period was not only dynamic, but many areas of
law underwent profound transformation.5 Prior to Heller, there had been
relatively little scholarship on the scope of this pre-existing right. Most of the
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1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 191 (2008); Cass Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 246 (2008).
3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
4. See id. at 582–615 (referring to sources from the 1700s to post–Civil War legislation).
5. The Court had last dealt with the Second Amendment in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939), in which it ruled that because shotguns with barrels less than eighteen inches in length had no
relationship to a well-regulated militia, the Second Amendment did not guarantee a right to keep and
bear such firearms. For examples of scholarly reactions to Heller, see THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON
TRIAL: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER (Saul Cornell & Nathan Kozuskanich
eds., 2013) (providing a series of academic responses to the decision). On the transformation of AngloAmerican law in this period, see JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (2011).
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legal scholarship on the Second Amendment prior to Heller simply ignored the
problem of historical change entirely.6 Yet, during the interval between 1688 and
the next century and a half, Anglo-American law underwent profound
transformation, which had far reaching consequences for law, including the
meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.7 Recognizing the importance of
change over time, the essence of any truly historical account, is not simply
important to correct the historical record, Heller’s holding makes history central
to the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence. “Although we do not
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second
Amendment,” the majority wrote “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions.”8 Thus, according to Heller, establishing a
legitimate historical pedigree for gun regulation has become one key to
determining if a restriction is presumptively lawful under Heller’s framework.
This article analyzes a neglected area of Second Amendment scholarship: the role
of common law restrictions on the scope of keeping and bearing arms in the
period between the Glorious Revolution (1688) and the Early American
Republic (1800–1835).
II
HELLER’S HISTORICAL PARADOX
Although Heller posited a static pre-existing English right that had become
fixed by the time of the Glorious Revolution, the half century following the
Glorious Revolution witnessed a number of important changes in the way the law
addressed arms. At the dawn of the eighteenth century the scope of the right to
have arms and the meaning of self-defense under English law was quite narrow.
Indeed, it would be more accurate to describe the right of self-defense as an
exemption from prosecution, not a positive rights claim in the modern sense.9
The English Declaration of Rights affirmed the right of Protestants to have arms
suitable to their condition, as the law allowed, but it did not sanction the use of
deadly force in most circumstances and did not even imply a right to own a gun
in most situations.10 What the law did do was acknowledge that one could not be
prosecuted for homicide in self-defense. To effectuate this claim, one might use
whatever weapons one was legally entitled to possess. The right to keep and use
arms was limited by class and religion and subject to extensive Parliamentary

6. See Sanford Levinson, United States: Assessing Heller, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 316 (2009) at 326;
Sunstein, supra note 2.
7. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. Heller relied on the work of English historian Joyce Lee Malcolm, JOYCE
LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1996).
For critiques of Malcolm’s history, see LOIS SCHWOERER, GUN CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 169 (2016); Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home, Take
Two: How We Got Here and Why it Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373 (2016).
8. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 626.
9. Daryl A. H. Miller, Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 2, 2017, at 89–90.
10. Infra Part III.
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regulation. Over the course of the next half century, English courts used common
law methods of legal interpretation and expanded the scope of this right,
eventually recognizing that ownership of a gun in the home for reasons of selfdefense was legal. Although Heller mistakenly attributed this legal proposition
to the English Declaration of Rights of 1688,11 the right of self-defense had
evolved under common law in the half century following the Glorious
Revolution.
The scope of the right to carry arms in public, by contrast, remained narrowly
defined and limited to a range of specific situations defined by common law and
statute. In particular, the right to travel armed for reasons of self-defense was
always balanced against the need to preserve the King’s Peace. The preservation
of the peace trumped the right to have arms in most circumstances.12
The American Revolution may have republicanized this legal tradition, but it
did not break with it immediately in a number of key areas. Even after the
adoption of new state constitutions, some of which affirmed the right to keep and
bear arms, the scope of the right was still shaped by the common law tradition,
including the necessity of preserving the peace. In the decades after the American
Revolution, what had been a single English common law tradition splintered,
producing different regional regulatory regimes. By the middle of the antebellum
era in parts of the slave South a permissive regime regarding the open carry of
arms gained traction. In other parts of the South, civic republican ideas continued
to constrain the scope of the right. Finally, starting in New England and spreading
across the nation a more restrictive view of public carry evolved.
The primary bodies of sources consulted for this study are the popular legal
guidebooks written for justices of the peace that proliferated in the 150 years
following the Glorious Revolution.13 These texts provide some of the best
accounts of popular understandings of Anglo-American legal principles in this
period.14 Written for justices of the peace, constables, and coroners, these guides
were addressed to an audience with no formal legal training.15 Their authors
summarized the common understanding of the law and often included boilerplate
examples of common legal writs and other useful documents.16 In many parts of
the Anglo-American world, including rural England and the settler societies of
the Atlantic world, there were relatively few persons formally trained in the law,
so it is hardly surprising that this genre of legal texts became extremely popular.17

11. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.
12. Infra Part VI.
13. See Larry M. Boyer, The Justice of the Peace in England and America from 1506 to 1776: A
Bibliographic History, 34 Q.J. LIBR. CONG. 315 (1977) (discussing the importance of popular guide books
in England and America).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See John A. Conley, Doing it by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in
Eighteenth Century America, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 257 (1985). For an illustration of how these texts shaped
legal culture in the colonies, see Alfred Brophy, “For the Preservation of the King’s Peace and Justice”:
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The popularity of these texts also reflects the important role that justices of the
peace played in keeping the peace in Anglo-American communities on both sides
of the Atlantic. Many of these texts went through multiple editions over the
course of the next century and a half, making them an excellent source for
tracking the changing meaning of legal concepts over time.18 The proliferation of
these books did not cease after the American Revolution. Indeed, the need for
them multiplied because each state in the new American Republic had to grapple
with its own unique relationship to the evolution of the common law. By the
middle of the antebellum era, the common English legal heritage had become
differentiated into distinctive regional legal cultures.19 Although popular legal
guidebooks have occasionally been cited in recent Second Amendment
scholarship, the use of these texts has been highly selective and impressionistic.20
Looking at these sources in a more systematic fashion reveals a process of
change far more complex than previous accounts have suggested.21
An understanding of the evolving nature of the right to keep and carry arms
is not only essential to implementing Heller’s historical framework, but it may
also offer insight into how to resolve some of the contradictions and
jurisprudential problems created by the opinion.22 In his dissent, Justice Breyer
suggested a balancing model that Justice Scalia dismissed as incompatible with
the original understanding of the right to keep and bear arms. But it turns out
that Breyer and Scalia’s divergent approaches may not have been legally
incompatible in the Founding era.23 Something analogous to a balancing exercise
was fundamental to the way Anglo-American law dealt with arms throughout
this period.24 The liberty interest associated with the right to arms was always
balanced against the concept of the peace.25 If an individual’s exercise of this right
threatened the peace, individuals could be disarmed, imprisoned, and forced to
provide a peace bond.26 The American Revolution republicanized the concept of
the King’s Peace by transmuting it into the people’s peace, but the Revolution
Community and English Law in Sussex County, Pennsylvania, 1682–1696, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 167
(1996).
18. See infra Parts IV–VII.
19. Infra Part IX.
20. Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101
(2009). See also David Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
(2016) (using justice of the peace manuals in an impressionistic manner and reading them
anachronistically by failing to recognize that early modern English criminal law had no modern mens rea
requirement for establishing criminal intent); cf. GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 139–42 (2016).
21. See infra Bibliography (listing the texts consulted for this essay).
22. Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012) (explaining that lower courts have been applying a form of intermediate
scrutiny that entails some aspects of balancing).
23. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling
for use of a balancing test and arguing that “there simply is no untouchable constitutional right to keep
loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden urban areas.”).
24. Infra Part VI.
25. Infra Part VI.
26. Infra Part VI.
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did not repudiate the centrality of the balancing process used to determine if
armed travel violated the peace.27
III
ARMS SUITABLE TO THEIR CONDITION AND AS ALLOWED BY LAW
The English Declaration of Rights (1688) affirmed: “[t]hat the subjects which
are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and
as allowed by law.”28 Although Blackstone described this as the fifth auxiliary
right, a protection of English liberty, his discussion underscores the limited
nature of this claim, which he described as “a public allowance, under due
restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of
oppression.”29 Blackstone’s elaboration of the right makes it clear that its
inclusion in the Declaration of Rights did not limit Parliament’s authority over
arms in any way.30 In fact, the formulation of the right reasserted Parliament’s
plenary power to legislate on matters pertaining to arms and, when necessary,
restrict this right in a manner consistent with its nearly unlimited powers to
protect the peace and promote public safety.31 Perhaps the best illustration of
how the scope of this right was understood in the period immediately after the
Glorious Revolution is Parliament’s debate over a revision to the Game Laws in
1692. The game laws, which regulated hunting, had imposed stiff penalties on the
possession of guns for those who failed to meet the property requirements
imposed by the acts. The House of Commons considered and rejected by a two
to one majority a rider to the act that would have allowed “any Protestant to keep
a Musquet in his House, notwithstanding this or any other act.”32 The reaction of
the House of Lords was no less negative, it quashed the idea as too radical
because it tended to “arm the mob.”33
27. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH (2009) (examining the
evolution of post-Revolution judicial systems and their focus on maintaining peace).
28. 1 W. & M. 2, ch. 2 (1689).
29. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. Blackstone describes such rights as follows:
“But in vain would these rights be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if
the constitution had provided no other method to secure their actual enjoyment. It has therefore
established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as barriers to
protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property.”
30. Id.
31. On Parliamentary power in this period, see DAVID J. LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF
LEGISLATION DETERMINED (1989).
32. 10 H.C. JOUR., 1688-93, at 823–24 (1802); BRITISH HISTORY ONLINE, http://www.britishhistory.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol10/pp823-824 [https://perma.cc/TPF9-3X97] (last accessed Oct. 17, 2016).
33. See Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal and Textual Analysis of
the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 403 (2009) (noting the lack of a pre-existing
right to “having arms”); Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 27, 35 (2000) (discussing the failed effort to amend the game laws to allow subjects to keep
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The game laws not only limited who might keep arms, they also placed limits
on who could travel armed and in what manner.34 As the game laws make clear,
the pre-existing English Right embodied in the Declaration of Rights did not
encompass a claim to possess guns if one failed to meet the property requirements
imposed by the game acts.35 Instead, the Declaration of Rights assumed that the
scope of the right of self-defense was extremely narrow, amounting to little more
than an exemption from prosecution should one need to defend oneself against
a deadly assault.36 Thus, one might use any weapon legally possessed but not
demand any particular weapon to exercise this right.37
One of the most prolific popularizers of the law in the period after the
Glorious Revolution was Giles Jacob, who authored a popular legal dictionary
and several general guides to the law.38 Jacob helped expand popular legal writing
as a genre. He summarized the general rule for self-defense concisely: “there
must be an unavoidable Necessity for Self-preservation to making killing
justifiable.”39 Individuals were obliged to retreat, not stand their ground.40
William Blackstone endorsed this view later in the century, when he wrote:
[T]his right of preventive defence, but in sudden and violent cases; when certain and
immediate suffering would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law.
Wherefore, to excuse homicide by the plea of self-defence, it must appear that the slayer
had no other possible means of escaping from his assailant.41

William Hawkins, another influential English legal commentator in the first
half of the eighteenth-century, underscored the way in which the exercise of this
right was exceedingly sensitive to the time and place in which an assault occurred.

arms).
34. For examples of the various game acts, THE GAME LAW: OR, A COLLECTION OF THE LAWS
AND STATUTES MADE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE GAME OF THIS KINGDOM 13, 36 (5th ed. 1714).
35. See WILLIAM NELSON, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND CONCERNING THE GAME OF HUNTING,
HAWKING, FISHING, AND FOWLING, 167–77 (2d ed. 1727),
36. For an elaboration of this point, see Miller, supra note 9, at 89–90.
37. Although the maxim that “when the law doth give anything to any man, it giveth also, impliedly,
whatsoever is necessary for the taking and enjoying of the same” might seem to apply to specific arms,
this rule must be read against the Declaration of Rights’ affirmation that subjects were only entitled to
“arms suitable to their condition” and the game laws property requirements for owning firearms. For this
and other relevant maxims, see THE GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND EQUITY 321 (1749).
38. On its role in expanding the genre of popular legal writing, see Julia Rudolph, That “Blunderbuss
of Law”: Giles Jacob, Abridgement, and Print Culture, 37 STUD. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CULTURE 197
(2008).
39. On the limited scope of self-defense under English law at this moment in history, see GILES
JACOB, THE LAWS OF APPEALS AND MURDER 46 (1719). See also MATHEW HALE, PLEAS TO THE
CROWN (1707); WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1716).
40. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184. See also GILES JACOB, A LAW GRAMMAR;
OR RUDIMENTS OF THE LAW: COMPILED FROM THE GROUNDS, PRINCIPLES, MAXIMS, TERMS, WORDS
OF ART, RULES, AND MOOT-POINTS OF OUR LAW 22 (1744) (explaining that deadly force was justified
in the case of sudden attach where there was no opportunity to retreat).
41. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *184.
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In his influential treatise, Pleas to the Crown, he wrote:
[I]n all these Cases, there ought to be a Distinction between an Assault in the Highway
and an Assault in a Town; for in the first Case it is said, That the Person assaulted may
justify killing the other without giving back at all: But that in the second Case, he ought
to retreat as far as he can without apparently hazarding his Life, in respect of the
Probability of getting Assistance.42

Modern rights claims are typically not context dependent, even if they may
be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.43 Self-defense
under English common law was almost the opposite of a modern rights claim.
The right could only be claimed under specific circumstances that were
determined by the time, place, and manner of the threat.44 The burden of proof
was on the subject, not the crown, to show that deadly force had been justified
because retreat and the opportunity to seek assistance were impossible. Violent
confrontation did not justify the use of deadly force. Subjects were required to
retreat rather than stand their ground in most circumstances45
A different set of rules applied to confrontations in the home where there was
no duty to retreat. It was a well-established maxim under common law that there
was no duty to retreat from an attack in the home.46 Yet, even this cherished
principle of common law, the castle doctrine, was bounded and context sensitive.
Deadly force was not justified in every case of trespass; a mere trespass at night
might justify deadly force while a similar act in the day would not.47
One of the most important changes in English law regarding self-defense was
a slow and gradual recognition that keeping a gun in the home enjoyed some
measure of legal protection.48 At the end of the seventeenth century there was no
right to own firearms under English law. The English Declaration of Rights
acknowledged that access to firearms could be limited by class and religion. The
various game acts specified with great precision the amount of property required
to make owning a firearm legal. Gradually, over the course of the eighteenth
century, English courts began reinterpreting the game laws using common law
methods of interpretation, eventually concluding that that the mere presence of

42. HAWKINS, supra note 39, at 73.
43. For a discussion of time, place, and manner restrictions in the context of modern First
Amendment doctrine, see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
44. JACOB, supra note 40, at 21–22.
45. HAWKINS, supra note 39, at 73.
46. JACOB, supra note 39, at 46–48.
47. Id.
48. See Rex v. Gardner, 93 Eng. Rep. 1056 (K.B. 1739) (holding that simply possessing a gun is
permissible because “a gun is necessary for defence of a house, or for a farmer to shoot crows”); Wingfield
v. Stratford, 96 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1752) (reinterpreting the game laws, the King’s Bench concluded
that they were not supposed “to disarm all the people of England”). Joyce Lee Malcolm erroneously
accepts the court’s historical conclusion at face value and reads the new conception of gun rights
backwards in time to 1688. See MALCOLM, supra note 7. The court’s conclusion is better interpreted as
an example of a style of common law legal reasoning that historian John Reid dubs forensic history. See
John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1993). English lawyers essentially
constructed a new version of the past to justify legal change, preserving the appearance that the law was
fixed.
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a gun in a home was no longer per se evidence of an attempt to illegally take
game.49 Further, courts finally acknowledged that there might be other legitimate
and legal uses for guns, most notably pest control and home defense.50 Although
English courts articulated this legal doctrine by the end of the 1730s, this new,
more robust understanding of the law took some time to permeate English legal
culture. Popular guides to the law did not start to reflect the new understanding
until the 1750s.51
IV
NO MAN, GREAT OR SMALL, SHALL GO OR RIDE ARMED: THE STATUTE OF
NORTHAMPTON
One of the most significant constraints on armed travel was the Statute of
Northampton (1328) enacted during the reign of Edward III. The act declared
that all individuals, regardless of their station, were bound to “bring no force in
affray of the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day.”52 The statute
also provided a means of enforcement. Agents of the King could arrest violators
who would be obliged “to forfeit their armour to the King, and their bodies to
prison at the King’s pleasure.” The language of the Statute of Northampton was
often included, or paraphrased in the texts of the various Royal Peace
Commissions issued by Edward III enjoining localities to keep the peace of the
realm. In 1361 Parliament created the office of justice of the peace, and endowed
it with broad powers to enforce law and order. 53
The legal authority to enforce the Statute of Northampton became one of the
many powers associated with the office of the justice of the peace. Writing over
two hundred years after the office of the justice of the peace was created, the
influential Elizabethan lawyer William Lambarde underscored this point in his
popular legal text Eirenarcha. Lambarde’s gloss on the Statute of Northampton
was also copied nearly verbatim into another legal text he authored, The Duties
of Constables: “[I]f any person whatsoever shall be so bold, as to go, or ride
armed, by night, or by day, in Faires, Markets, or any other places: then any
Constable, or any other of the saide Officers, may take such Armour from him,

49. Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551 (2006).
50. See Rex, 93 Eng. Rep. at 1056.
51. The evidence also suggests that changes in case law did not immediately translate into new
treatments in the standard guides to the law. See RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND
PARISH OFFICER 468 (2d ed. 1756) (demonstrating that there was a lag time between the cases and their
incorporation in popular legal guidebooks).
52. Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); 20 Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.).
53. On the historical origins of the Statute of Northampton, see A. MUSSON & W. M. ORMROD, THE
EVOLUTION OF ENGLISH JUSTICE: LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
(1998) and Anthony Verduyn, The Politics of Law and Order during the Early Years of Edward III, 108
ENG. HIST. REV. 842 (1993). On the role of justices of the peace in the maintenance of law in order in
early modern England, see STEVE HINDLE, THE STATE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND, 1550–1640 66–93 (2000) and A.J. Musson, Sub-Keepers and Constables: The Role of Local
Officials in Keeping the Peace in Fourteenth-Century England, 117 ENG. HIST. REV. 1 (2002).
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for the Queenes use, & may also commit him to the Gaole.”54 The text of the
Statute of Northampton and glosses on its main provisions were frequently
reprinted in both elite and popular legal guides over the next century.55 Another
measure of its pervasiveness may be found in the writings of Whig theorist James
Tyrell, who cited it in his influential defense of the Glorious Revolution
Bibliotheca Politica.56 A conservative Whig, Tyrell sought to defend the Glorious
Revolution, but also aimed to blunt the most radical and potentially destabilizing
arguments about the right of revolution being bandied about in public debate.57
Although Tyrrell conceded that there was a limited right “to take up Arms” in
response to “illegal Violence,” he was emphatic that this did not sanction
traveling armed under normal circumstances.58 To substantiate this claim, Tyrell
cited the Statute of Northampton, reading it as imposing a broad general
prohibition on armed travel. Thus, Tyrell wrote it was a crime “so much as to ride
or go arm’d as may appear in the Statute of Northampton.”59
The City of London enacted its own local ordinance limiting armed travel that
drew on the language of the Statute of Northampton. London’s prohibition was
equally sweeping: “no one, of whatever condition he be, go armed in the said city
or in the suburbs, or carry arms by day or night.”60 A decade after the adoption
of the English Declaration, the force of this restriction was evidenced by a
complaint published in a London paper that reported “that several Persons not
Qualified by the Laws of this Realm, to carry Arms, have nevertheless in
contempt and Violation of the Law, taken on them to Ride and Go Armed.”61
Legal commentators, both in popular justice of the peace manuals and
learned treatises, treated the Statute of Northampton as a foundational principle
for enforcing the peace.62 Writing at the close of the eighteenth century, the
54. WILLIAM LAMBARDE, THE DUTIES OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, TYTHINGMEN, AND
SUCH OTHER LOW AND LAY MINISTERS OF THE PEACE 6–14 (1602). On Lambarde’s influence, see
Wilfrid Prest, William Lambarde, Elizabethan Law Reform, and Early Stuart Politics, 34 J. BRIT. STUD.
464 (1995). Lambarde copied this passage verbatim into THE DUTIES OF CONSTABLES (1602). Gun rights
scholar Joyce Lee Malcolm erroneously claims that the statute fell into desuetude, see MALCOLM, supra
note 7. For arguments showing that this was not the case, see Charles, supra note 7, at 393.
55. See MALCOLM, supra note 7, at 104.
56. JAMES TYRELL, BIBLIOTHECA POLITICA: OR AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT BOTH IN RESPECT TO THE JUST EXTENT OF REGAL
POWER, AND THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT 639 (1694).
57. According to historian Martyn Thompson, Tyrell played a key role in popularizing Locke’s ideas
in the 1690s. Martyn Thompson, The Reception of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government 1690–1705, 24
POL. STUD. 184 (1976). For a brief but lucid discussion of Tyrell’s relevance to early Whig political theory,
see Tim Harris, James II, the Glorious Revolution, and the Destiny of Britain, 51 HIST. J. 763, 768 (2008).
58. See TYRELL, supra note 56, at 639.
59. Id.
60. JOHN CARPENTER & RICHARD WHITINGTON, LIBER ALBUS: THE WHITE BOOK OF THE CITY
OF LONDON 335 (Henry Thomas Riley trans., 1862).
61. THE POST BOY (London), Dec. 21, 1699, at 1; see also SAMUEL BLACKERBY, THE JUSTICE OF
PEACE HIS COMPANION 4 (1715).
62. For a sample of texts making this argument, see JACOB, supra note 40, at 426 (citing Hawkins
and Blackstone for authority on this proposition and treating the prohibition on traveling armed
embodied in the Statute of Northampton separately from the related common law crime of affray);
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author of The Grammar of English Law, echoed this account by confidently
asserting that “no man, great or small, shall go or ride armed, by night or by day,
with dangerous or unusual weapons, terrifying the good people of the land.”63
J.P. Gent’s A New Guide for Constables (1705) averred that the Statute of
Northampton prohibited riding or going “armed offensively” before the “King’s
Justices” or in “Fairs or Markets.”64 Additionally, Joseph Keble, author of
another popular guide to the law, warned that if anyone was so “bold as to go or
ride Armed, by night or day, in Fairs, Markets, or any other places,” constables
could disarm him and “commit him to the Goal.”65
Another formulation of the prohibition on armed travel described it in terms
of traveling with “offensive arms,” a category that encompassed but was not
restricted to firearms. Although a firearm was always an offensive weapon under
English law, other items in certain circumstances could fit this legal definition.66
The infamous Black Act (1723), which punished poachers, and several of the acts
passed against smuggling in the eighteenth-century referred to “firearms and
other offensive weapons.”67 The Complete Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1764)
defined firearms as the quintessential offensive weapons in the eyes of the law:
“GUN, fire-arm, a weapon of offense. . . .”68 Defensive weapons were understood
in traditional terms, such as shields and armor.69 Under English law, a gun was
always an offensive weapon.70
Another common formulation of the prohibition on armed travel described
the crime in terms of traveling with “dangerous or unusual weapons.”71 Hawkins,
in his influential Pleas to the Crown, chose a slightly different way to describe the
same principle. He noted that the prohibition extended to arming with
“dangerous and unusual weapons.”72 All of these legal formulations aimed to

LAMBARDE, supra note 54, at 6–14.
63. JACOB, supra note 40, at 426; see also MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE,
CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 30 (1618)
(providing a similar account).
64. J.P. GENT, A NEW GUIDE FOR CONSTABLES, HEAD-BOROUGHS, TYTHINGMEN,
CHURCHWARDENS 13 (1705) (clearly distinguished between being offensively armed and the crime of
affray). See also, BURN, supra note 51.
65. JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, FOR THE EASIER
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 147, 224 (1683).
66. JELLINGER SYMONS, EXCISE LAWS ABRIDGED, AND DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER
HEADS, IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER (2d ed. 1775); see also, E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS:
THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975) (describing Parliament’s effort to punish poachers).
67. THOMPSON, supra note 66 (describing Parliament’s effort to punish poachers).
68. THE COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES (1764); THOMAS WALTER WILLIAMS,
THE WHOLE LAW RELATIVE TO THE DUTY AND OFFICE OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE: COMPRISING
ALSO THE AUTHORITY OF PARISH OFFICERS (1793). See also HAWKINS, supra note 39.
69. CHARLES JAMES, A NEW AND ENLARGED MILITARY DICTIONARY (1805).
70. For evidence of the way English law treated guns, see the sources cited supra notes 61–67.
71. ROBERT GARDINER, THE COMPLETE CONSTABLE 9 (1724).
72. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at *148–49 (1803).
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achieve the same goal: limit armed travel in public, particularly in populous
areas.73
Concealable weapons posed a different set of problems from the Statute of
Northampton as this Elizabethan era statute makes clear:
Actes of Parliament remaining of force, which included the tenets of the Statute of
Northampton to prohibit the carrying of Dagges, Pistolles, and such like, not only in
Cities and Townes, [but] in all partes of the Realme in common high[ways], whereby
her Majesties good qu[i]et people, desirous to live in peaceable manner, are in feare and
danger of their lives.74

Given that concealable weapons were culturally associated with furtive
motives, it was only natural that English law categorically prohibited travel with
them. Joseph Keble, author of the influential 1689 Justice of the Peace Manual,
reiterated this prohibition on “Dag[ge]s and Pistols,” instructing peace officers
to arrest any who traveled armed with these types of weapons.75 Localities, most
notably the city of London, enacted their own specific bans on traveling armed
with concealed weapons. London law prohibited traveling “by Night or by Day”
with a “Hand-Gun, having therewith Powder and Match.”76
V
EXEMPTIONS TO THE STATUTE OF NORTHAMPTON’S PROHIBITION ON
ARMED TRAVEL
The Statute of Northampton had three distinctive components: the common
law crime of affray, a ban on coming armed before the King’s representatives,
and a prohibition on armed travel in populous areas.77 Determining if one’s
actions constituted an affray was context dependent. The ban on appearing
armed before the King’s representatives and armed travel in populous areas were
categorical prohibitions. A number of interpretive canons were also associated

73. Modern gun rights advocates and libertarians have interpreted this text anachronistically,
arguing that weapons had to be both unusual and dangerous to trigger the prohibition. See discussion
supra note 20. This interpretation is flawed on many levels. Early modern English often used
“hendiadys,” a grammatical form in which a single idea is expressed by the use of two nouns linked by
the conjunction “and.” For a brief discussion, see CHRIS BALDICK, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
LITERARY TERMS 151 (3d ed., 2008); GENT, supra note 64 (arming offensively was a crime, making the
act of carrying arms dangerous and therefore unusual); Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and
“Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys In The Constitution 102 VA. L. REV. 687 (2016) (arguing for interpreting
“necessary and proper” and “cruel and unusual” each as expressing a singular idea despite their
conjunction of two terms).
74. BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE COMMON USE OF DAGGES,
HANDGUNNES, HARQUEBUZES, CALLIUERS, AND COTES OF DEFENCE 1 (Christopher Barker, London
1579) (internal quotations omitted).
75. Id. See also GENT, supra note 64 (describing the Statute of Northampton’s prohibition of going
“armed offensively” before the “King’s Justices” or in “Fairs or Markets”).
76. WILLIAM BOHUN, PRIVILEGIA LONDINI: OR, THE LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND PRIVILEGES OF THE
CITY OF LONDON 110 (1702).
77. Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328).
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with the Statute of Northampton and these were frequently included in popular
legal guides and learned commentaries.78
Charles James, author of A New and Enlarged Military Dictionary,
summarized the common law crime of affray as follows: “By the common law, it
is an offence for persons to go or ride armed with dangerous weapons.”79 Sir
Edward Coke’s formulation of this crime was widely copied by the compilers of
popular legal guidebooks in the eighteenth century.80 “Effrayer, which signifieth
to terrifie, or bring fear; and which the Law understandeth to be a common
wrong.”81 As with most crimes in this period of English history, proof of actual
intent to do harm was not required. Instead, the intent could be inferred from the
illegal act itself.82 In the 1689 edition of his Justice of the Peace manual, Joseph
Keble offered a lucid account of why armed travel violated the King’s peace
irrespective of any specific malicious intent:
Yet may an Affray be, without word or blow given; as if a man shall shew himself
furnished with Armour or Weapon which is not usually worn, it will strike a fear upon
others that be not armed as he is; and therefore both the Statutes of Northampton made
against wearing Armour, do speak of it. . . . 83

Another Justice of the Peace manual written in 1769 echoed Keble’s view that
the mere act of arming oneself created an asymmetry of power between the
individual armed and those unarmed, a situation that caused terror to the
people.84 Like previous commentators on the Statute of Northampton, the author
noted that the act of riding armed was the crime that created a terror to the
people, not a specific intent to terrorize.85
78. BURN, supra note 51, at 13.
79. CHARLES JAMES, A NEW AND ENLARGED MILITARY DICTIONARY (1805); see also Statute of
Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). On the common law crime of affray, see 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 40, at *148–49 (1803); HAWKINS, supra note 39, at 135–36.
80. In his account of the Statute of Northampton, gun rights activist David Kopel casts Tyrell as a
modern libertarian who defended an expansive right to travel armed, a characterization that is almost
the mirror image of what Tyrrell actually argues in the text. Kopel, supra note 20. Contra Charles, supra
note 33 (providing an extensive critique of Kopel’s interpretation).
81. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THE JUSTICES
OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 30 (1618) (providing a similar account).
82. As Simon Stern notes regarding Blackstone treatment of the concept of mens rea “Hence a
modern reader might expect to find, in Blackstone’s account, some discussion of acts versus intentions,
attempts versus completed offenses, and civil versus criminal proof standards, among other topics. That
Blackstone pursues these subjects only tangentially and intermittently may be explained by the relatively
scant attention devoted to them in the treatises and cases he had at his disposal. It was only in the
nineteenth century, in a body of theoretical literature (and with the aid of an analytical method)
facilitated to some extent by Blackstone’s model, that many of these distinctions came into visibility.”
Simon Stern, Blackstone’s Criminal Law: Common-Law Harmonization and Legislative Reform, in
FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 61 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014).
83. KEBLE, supra note 65, at 147. See also Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.), 20
Rich. 2, c. 1 (1396-97) (Eng.) (explaining why the mere act of traveling with an arm triggered an affray
irrespective of any particular threatening act or intent to commit a crime).
84. JOHN WARD, THE LAW OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 6–7 (1769) (Describing
that when a man furnishes “weapons not usually worn, it may strike a fear into others unarmed”).
85. Keble and Ward each articulated the standard view that there was no legal requirement need to
demonstrate a specific intent to cause terror because of asymmetrical nature of the encounter between
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All of the English legal guides enumerated a clear list of exemptions from the
general prohibition on traveling armed imposed by the Statute of Northampton.86
It would hardly have been necessary for legal guidebooks to set out such a list if
there had been a broad general right to travel armed in public. Among the most
important exceptions were cases in which subjects assisted in the lawful
suppression of violence, crime, riot, or revolt.87 Hawkins’ Pleas to the Crown
made it clear that, arming to “suppress rioters, rebels, and enemies” or assist
officers of the crown, was not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Statute
of Northampton.88 Indeed, in this situation arming oneself was as much a civic
obligation as it was a right. During the 1780 Gordon Riots in London, the
Recorder of London, the city’s chief lawyer, described this hybrid right–
obligation in forceful terms:
It seems, indeed, to be considered, by the ancient laws of this kingdom, not only a right,
but as a duty; for all the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to
be ready, at all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution
of the laws and the preservation of the public peace.89

The duty to assist agents of the Crown did not by itself justify owning a gun.90
The obligation merely meant one had to assist with whatever weapons one was
legally entitled to possess.91 Although in extraordinary circumstances individuals
might respond on their own to deal with one of these violations of the King’s
peace, contemporary guidebooks underscored the fact that it was always better
to await a summons by representative of the law before unilaterally arming
oneself and traveling to provide assistance to restore the King’s peace.92 If there
had been a broad and well-recognized right to travel armed in public, the advice
an individual armed and one unarmed.
86. See DALTON, supra note 63, at 30; GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (1729); KEBLE,
supra note 65, at 147, 224; JOHN MILTON NILES, THE CONNECTICUT CIVIL OFFICER 12 (1823)
(demonstrating the continuity in English legal views on the limited nature of the right to travel armed in
the period between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution); WARD, supra note 84, at 6–
7.
87. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A SUMMARY OF THE CROWN-LAW BY WAY OF ABRIDGMENT OF
SERJEANT HAWKINS’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN 155–63 (1728).
88. Id.
89. WILLIAM BLIZARD, DESULTORY REFLECTIONS ON POLICE: WITH AN ESSAY ON THE MEANS
OF PREVENTING CRIMES AND AMENDING CRIMINALS 59–60 (1785). Joyce Lee Malcolm erroneously
interprets this passage as asserting a broad individual right to have arms for personal protection, see
MALCOLM, supra note 7. Malcolm takes this well-known exception to the general prohibition to be the
norm under English law, one of many errors in her analysis. The Gordon Riots do not demonstrate a
broad right to have arms or travel armed public, but quite the opposite. For an opposing view, see
SCHWOERER, supra note 7.
90. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, the restrictions of the game laws would have
prohibited firearms ownership to those who failed to meet the property requirement. Those individuals
who failed to meet this requirement would have been expected to show up with appropriate weapons to
the station, either edged weapons or clubs.
91. Statute of Winchester, 1 Statutes of the Realm 26 1235–1377 (1275). “The needs of home defence
were met by the enforcement of obligations under the Statute of Winchester (1285) which required all
able-bodied males to carry arms in accordance with their station in life.” Ian W. Archer, The Burden of
Taxation on Sixteenth-Century London 44 HIST. J. 599, 620 (2001).
92. JOSEPH SHAW, THE PRACTICAL JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 81 (1728).
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proffered by this guidebook would have made little sense. As one legal text put
it: “the safest Way is to be armed in Assistance of the King’s Officers or Ministers
of Justice.”93
English law expressly forbid arming oneself in response to a specific
impending threat.94 There was broad agreement on this rule. “A Man cannot
excuse the wearing of such Armour in Publick, by alleging that such a one
threatened him, and that he wears it for the Safety of his Person from Assault.”95
The appropriate legal response was not to arm oneself. Instead one was required
to ensure that a representative of the law, typically a justice of the peace, enforce
the peace.
Timothy Dalton’s discussion of this important common law method of
enforcing the peace, Surety of the Peace, explained how representatives of the
King’s peace and ordinary citizens might seek out a peace bond to prevent or
punish individuals who might violate the Statute of Northampton:
All such as shall go or ride armed (offensively) in Fairs, Markets, or elsewhere; or shall
wear or carry any guns, dags or pistols charged . . . any Constable, seeing this, may arrest
them, and may carry them before the Justice of the Peace, and the Justice may bind
them to the peace. . . .96

Further, Dalton echoed the view that one might not justify arming oneself
because one had been threatened. “[Y]ea, though those Persons were so armed
or weaponed for their defense upon any private quarrel,” did not excuse arming
oneself which “striketh a fear and terror into the King’s subjects.”97 Rather than
encourage individuals to arm themselves in response to such threats, English law
required individuals to seek out a magistrate, justice of the peace, or constable
and have the aggressor disarmed and placed under a peace bond. If one had
reason to fear violence, the correct response was to seek out a representative of
the King’s justice. 98
VI
ARMED TRAVEL AS A REBUKE TO THE KING’S PEACE AND MAJESTY
It is also important to recognize that affray was a crime against the King’s
peace. Justices of the peace, constables, and sheriffs, had broad discretion and
latitude to arrest, disarm, or require a peace bond for those who threatened the
King’s peace. Indeed, any individual within a community might approach a
justice of the peace with evidence that a particular person posed a threat to public
safety and impose a peace bond or even have the person disarmed and jailed.99
Dalton’s Country Justice confidently asserted that any who “shall go or ride

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
HAWKINS, supra note 87, at 155–63 (1728).
Id.
DALTON, supra note 63, at 264.
Id.
SHAW, supra note 92, at 81 (1728).
SAMUEL BLACKERBY, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE: HIS COMPANION 4 (1723).
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armed offensively” were “accounted to be an Affray,” and causing a “Fear of the
People” created a “breach of the peace.”100
The paradigmatic exception to this general rule is itself instructive.
Aristocrats enjoyed a class-based privilege to travel armed or travel with armed
retainers in certain circumstances. Thus, there was a broad consensus that
members of the aristocracy did not violate the provision of the statute when they
armed themselves because such actions were not viewed as likely to provoke a
terror.101 Theodore Barlow, another author of a popular legal guide, described
this class-based privilege in lucid terms. “Wearing Arms, if not accompanied with
Circumstances of Terror, is not within this Statute; therefore People of Rank and
Distinction do not offend by wearing common Weapons.”102 Timothy
Cunningham, author of several legal texts including a legal dictionary, echoed
this account by commenting that men of “quality or fashion,” and their
“attendants” were not subject to the general restrictions on armed travel.103
The fact that some members of the elite classes enjoyed a limited exemption
from prosecution for affray for mere possession of arms in public underscores the
limited scope of this right. Noting the existence of such an exemption only made
sense in the context of the broad prohibition on traveling armed in public. The
right of English aristocrats to arms does not support the notion that there was a
broad right of peaceable armed travel. Under English law, there was no general
right to travel armed.104
The notion that a broad right to peaceable armed travel existed in early
modern England would have been legally incoherent given concepts such as the
King’s peace and the King’s majesty. “The common law,” Blackstone observed,
“hath ever had a special care and regard for the conservation of the peace; for
peace is the very end and foundation of civil society.”105 Under English law “all
offenses are either against the King’s Peace or his crown and dignity.”106 In
addition, any “affront to that power, and breaches of those rights, are immediate

100. DALTON, supra note 63, at 30. Cf. KEBLE, supra note 65; WARD, supra note 84 (providing a
similar account of the cause of the terror at the root of the crime of affray).
101. BURN, supra note 51, at 13.
102. THEODORE BARLOW, THE JUSTICE OF PEACE: A TREATISE CONTAINING THE POWER AND
DUTY OF THAT MAGISTRATE 12 (1745).
103. GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1750) (entry under “Armour and Arms,” no
pagination in original).
104. On rank in English Society, see KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY: 1580–1680 (1982).
Eugene Volokh argues that, “only public carrying ‘accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to
terrify the people’ was thus seen as prohibited; but ‘wearing common weapons’ in ‘the common fashion’
was legal.” Volokh, supra note 20, at 101. Volokh imputes a modern style mens rea requirement instead
of applying the standards for criminal intent appropriate to early modern English law. For a discussion
of the history of the mens rea requirement, see BINDER, supra note 20, at 8, 96, 113, 137–46. The
references to common weapons carried in the common fashion is also read anachronistically. The
exemption he notes was not general but was class specific and limited to aristocrats and the arms of their
retainers, see the discussion in DALTON, supra note 63. HAWKINS, supra note 87.
105. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *349.
106. Id. at *258.
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offenses against him.”107 Merely traveling with arms impugned the majesty of the
crown and implied that the King and his representatives were incapable of
keeping the peace.108 Thus, to arm oneself, apart from the specific exemptions or
the context-dependent exceptions recognized by the common law, was by its very
nature a rebuke of the King’s peace and majesty.109
Sir John Knight’s Case illustrates the way the Statute of Northampton should
be set against a web of larger English principles, including the concept of the
King’s Peace.110 Gun rights scholars have consistently misread the case, arguing
that it helped establish a right of peaceable open carry. In fact, the case stood for
the opposite principle. It revealed that even aristocrats, the one group expressly
exempted from the Statute of Northampton, were not completely immune from
prosecution for traveling with arms.111
The case can only properly be understood within the historical context of the
tense period between the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution: a time
when partisan and religious struggles divided the English nation.112 Rumors of
conspiracies circulated widely.113 Issues of religious tolerance, the problem of
monarchical succession, and the continuing battle between Parliament and the
King were among the most important political and legal issues dividing
England.114 The key figure in the case, Sir John Knight, was a militant Protestant,
who opposed tolerance for Catholics and Dissenters. He was charged with
violating the Statute of Northampton by walking armed about the streets of
Bristol. 115 Sir John burst into a Catholic religious service to arrest a priest. These
actions prompted his own arrest, and he was charged with affray and violating
the Statute of Northampton. The jury, composed of other militant Protestants
drawn from Knight’s community, was sympathetic to his anti-Catholicism and
acquitted him.116 Although Knight escaped punishment thanks to a sympathetic
jury, the government still imposed a peace bond on him as a surety of good
behavior in the future.117 Thus, Knight was still punished for his actions.
107. Id.
108. Peter Lake & Steve Pincus, Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England, 45 J. BR.
STUD. 270, 277 (2006).
109. See discussion supra note 104.
110. See 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (1686).
111. But cf. David Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
(2016) (misinterpreting Sir John Knight’s Case by concluding that “Everyone in the case agreed that the
Statute of Northampton outlawed only carrying in a terrifying manner.”). Malcolm also misreads the
case, see MALCOLM, supra note 7, at 104–05.
112. See J.G.A. Pocock & Gordon J. Schocket, Interregnum and Restoration, in THE VARIETIES OF
BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT 146 (J.G.A. Pocock et al. eds., 1993) (providing a useful overview of the
topic).
113. See STEVEN C.A. PINCUS, ENGLAND’S GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 1688–1689: A BRIEF HISTORY
WITH DOCUMENTS (2005).
114. Id.
115. NARCISSUS LUTTRELL, 1 A BRIEF HISTORICAL RELATION OF STATE AFFAIRS FROM
SEPTEMBER 1678 TO APRIL 1714 389 (1857).
116. Id.
117. 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (1686) (The militantly Protestant jury had essentially nullified the charge by
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Far from proving that a permissive attitude towards firearms had emerged by
the end of the seventeenth century, the case shows that even members of the
aristocracy, the one group expressly exempted from the prohibition on armed
travel, were not entirely free to exercise this right in public with impunity.
Further, the case gives no indication that the English Courts had abandoned the
principles embedded in the Statute of Northampton or that it had fallen into
desuetude. It was the jury, not the judges, who reached the verdict in this highly
politicized setting. Finally, rather than demonstrate that the Statute of
Northampton had ceased to have any meaning under English law, the judges and
subsequent legal commentators on Sir John Knight’s Case offered a very different
gloss on the meaning of the case. The case reporter itself reminded readers that
the common law offense of affray was not simply a crime against a specific
individual or even the local community but a crime against the public and hence
a direct challenge to the legal authority of the King.118 The private act of arming
oneself was an inherent affront to the King because it implied that the “King
w[as] not able or willing to protect his subjects.”119
VII
COLONIAL TEXTS, THE ENGLISH LEGACY, AND THE AMERICANIZATION OF
THE COMMON LAW
Popular legal guidebooks published in the colonies repeated the standard
interpretations of the Statute of Northampton that had appeared in English legal
texts. George Webb’s Virginian Justice of Peace (1736) was the first text
published in Virginia.120 Four decades later another popular guide appeared in
North Carolina and it framed these issues in language drawn directly from
English authority: “Justices of the Peace, upon their own View, or upon
Complaint, may apprehend any Person who shall go or ride armed with unusual
and offensive weapons, in an Affray, or among any great Concourse of People. .
. .”121 Both texts recognized the continuing relevance of earlier categorical
prohibitions, such as not coming armed before the King’s representatives. These
new American texts generally tracked earlier English texts closely in most
regards. The legal consequences of slavery figured in these texts to different
degrees, but the general framework applied to armed travel in public remained
largely, but not entirely, consistent with earlier English law in this area.122 One of
finding in favor of Knight so the Court’s only legal option was a peace bond. The case does not
demonstrate that the traveling armed in public had been normalized or decriminalized, but the exact
opposite.)
118. See Charles, supra note 33.
119. 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (1686).
120. GEORGE WEBB, VIRGINIAN JUSTICE OF PEACE (1736).
121. See JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (1774)
(citing MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE CONTAINING THE PRACTICE, DUTY AND POWER
OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AS WELL IN AS OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 37 (1705)). Webb expressly
framed the prohibition in general terms of traveling armed in populous areas.
122. See id.
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the most pronounced differences between colonial law and English law was the
expansion of the number of situations in which individuals were required to carry
arms to enforce the peace. Under the common law, subjects could be required to
assist agents of the crown in preserving the peace.123 The raising of the “hue and
cry” was one of the most important examples of an exception to the prohibition
on armed travel.124 Constables and other representatives of the King’s justice
were empowered to raise the hue and cry and enlist subjects to apprehend felons.
Once the hue and cry was raised, individuals were allowed to arm themselves
with whatever weapons they were legally entitled to possess.125
In some colonies, most notably southern colonies, those eligible to bear arms
might also be required to travel armed on occasions not related to musters, such
as going to church.126 These laws were another adaptation to the realities of
colonial life, especially the ongoing hostile relationship with Native Americans
and the omnipresent danger of slave uprisings in the South. Relations between
Virginians and their Indian neighbors were exceedingly tense in 1619. This helps
account for Virginia’s passage of a law expanding the scope of normal militia
duties and requiring colonists liable to bear arms127 to travel armed to church.128
ALL men that are fittinge to beare armes, shall bringe their peices to the church uppon
payne for every effence, if the default be in the master, to pay 2lb. of tobacco, to be
disposed by the church-wardens, who shall levy it by distresse, and the servants shall be
punished commander. 129

When read in context, the law demonstrates the extraordinary power early
colonial governments exercised over inhabitants. Further, it does not vindicate a
strong liberty interest that might be claimed against government authority. A
similar act was passed by the Georgia legislature in 1770, that required “every
white male inhabitant of this province . . . who is or shall be liable to bear arms in
the militia” to bring arms to church.130 The preamble of the Statute made clear
that the purpose of the law was to promote the “necessary . . . security and
defense of this province from internal dangers and insurrections. . . .”131
The militia played a far more significant role in the colonies than it did in
England. It served as a first line of defense against external and internal threats

123. HAWKINS, supra note 87, at 155–63.
124. SIR JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 358 (4th ed. 1793).
125. See also Statute of Winchester, supra note 91.
126. See WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 198 (1823).
127. This requirement only applied to individuals who were already able to bear arms, a subset of the
white male population.
128. See HENING, supra note 126. Early Virginia imposed a variety of obligations on its residents,
especially regarding religion. Parents could be penalized for not properly instructing children and
apprentices in the catechism endorsed by the Church of England. Id. at 181–82. It also taxed colonists to
support the established church and penalized those who failed to attend church. Id. at 184. In short,
modern style rights were in short supply in early Virginia.
129. Id. at 174.
130. Act of Feb. 27, 1770, No. 191 (Judiciary Act of Georgia of 1770), in ROBERT WATKINS &
GEORGE WATKINS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 157 (1800).
131. Id.
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and was one of the most important local institutions in many communities.132
Most colonies, with Quaker Pennsylvania being a notable exception, typically
required adult white men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five, who were
not infirm or exempt because of their occupation, to equip themselves with a
musket or rifle and participate in the militia.133 The notion that the militia was
literally the people was a potent rhetorical form, but largely a fiction. Although
a substantial portion of the adult free male population was required to participate
in the militia, equating the militia with the people is a mistake.134
One of the clearest expositions of the way the constitutional ideal of the
militia had been transformed by the colonial experience occurs in a remarkable
series of essays published by Samuel Adams in the midst of the worsening
relations with Britain prior to the American Revolution. Adams defended the
Boston Town meeting’s decision to call on residents to arms themselves, invoking
English and local legal authority.
For it is certainly beyond human art and sophistry to prove that British subjects, to
whom the privilege of possessing arms is expressly recognized by the Bill of Rights, and,
who live in a province where the law requires them to be equip’d with arms, &c. are
guilty of an illegal act, in calling upon one another to be provided with them, as the law
directs.135
How little do those persons attend to the rights of the constitution, if they know
anything about them, who find fault with a late vote of this town, calling upon the
inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their defence at any time; but more
especially, when they had reason to fear, there would be a necessity of the means of self
preservation against the violence of oppression. —Every one knows that the exercise of
the military power is forever dangerous to civil rights. . . .136

Adams did not rest his claim entirely on British sources alone, but also
invoked American law, specifically the militia law of the colony. The right Adams
described does not easily fit into the simple dichotomies that have defined Second
Amendment debate in the modern era. The right was one exercised by
individuals, but it was one effectuated by the Boston town meeting acting
collectively under legal authority it possessed. Individuals did not act on their
own accord, but acted in concert for a collective public purpose—the protection
of constitutional liberty. Nor was the right claimed by Adams and other colonists
a pure expression of natural rights. Boston had not entered the state of nature.
The appeal was to law, not to extra-legal authority. This particular right was an
expression of ordered liberty and only made sense within the context of the rule
of law. Bostonians were not simply asserting a common law right of self-defense.
The right they claimed was distinctly American, it fused together

132. Kevin Sweeney, Firearms, Militias, and the Second Amendment, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT
ON TRIAL, supra note 5, at 310 (discussing the role of the militia in early American society).
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. SAMUEL ADAMS, THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 299 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1904).
For more on Adams, see SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006).
136. ADAMS, supra note 135, at 318.
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several different traditional English rights claims and merged them with
American legal practices, effectively recasting them in a new distinctly American
constitutional framework.137
VIII
THE ABSORPTION OF THE COMMON LAW IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA
Samuel Adams and the Boston town meeting were engaging in a creative
process of constitutional theorizing and they were hardly unique in
Revolutionary America. Towns and communities across the nation had been
swept up in the political and constitutional ferment triggered by the imperial
crisis. These developments were accelerated when the Continental Congress
instructed the states to draft new constitutions a month before Independence was
officially declared.138 These first state constitutions typically included a written
declaration of rights. These new documents radically transformed many aspects
of American law, but they did not represent a complete break with pre-existing
English law, particularly regarding arms. Although a majority of the new
constitutions included prohibitions on standing armies, most did not single out
the right to bear arms for express protection. Pennsylvania was the first state to
do so, but it also included a right not to be forced to bear arms, a concession to
religious pacifists such as Quakers, Moravians, and Mennonites. Typically arms
bearing provisions also included express language about the need for civilian
control of the military. The pairing of the right to bear arms with a right not to
bear arms, and the close textual connection between the affirmation of civilian
control of the military and the right to bear arms only heightens the strong
military focus of these early provisions.
The American Revolution’s impact on the common law, including the right
to keep arms and restrictions on armed travel, was even more complicated.
Rather than speak of the common law’s Americanization, it might be accurate to
discuss its creolization in the colonial era and early Republic. Although there
were some important areas in which English law remained stable, there were also
many examples in which the law had evolved to reflect the different social and
legal realities of different colonies.139
Stressing the pervasive localism and evolutionary character of the absorption
of the common law, the distinguished Virginia jurist St. George Tucker believed
that:

137. See CORNELL, supra note 135; Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791:
What Individual Rights are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
1451 (2012).
138. G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 143 (2012).
139. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL America (2008); Lauren Benton &
Kathryn Walker, Law for the Empire: The Common Law In Colonial America and the Problem of Legal
Diversity, 89 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 937 (2014) (discussing the way different regional legal cultures emerged
and transformed the common law).
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the adoption of the laws of England, we see was confined to such as had been
theretofore adopted, used, and approved, within the colony, and usually practiced on,
in the courts of law; with an exception as to such parts as were repugnant to the rights
and liberties contained in the constitution.140

Moreover, Tucker noted that one might have recourse to “every law treatise
from Bracton, and Glanville, to Coke, Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone; or in
every reporter from the year-books to the days of Lord Mansfield,” but such
authority mattered little if the law was not consistent with the new state
constitutions.141 If that were the case, a law contrary to the text of the Constitution
would “have no more force in Massachusetts, than an edict of the emperor of
China.”142
Some states absorbed the common law by constitutional means. Thus,
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights affirmed:
The Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that law,
and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July,
seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found
applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and
practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity.143

Some states passed reception statutes, incorporating parts of the common
law. Pennsylvania’s statute affirmed that:
[E]ach and every one of the laws or acts of general assembly that were in force and
binding on the inhabitants of the said province on the fourteenth day of May last shall
be in force and binding on the inhabitants of this state from and after the tenth day of
February next . . . and the common law and such of the statute laws of England as have
heretofore been in force in the said province, except as is hereafter excepted.144

The primary function of the justice of the peace in the new American
Republic remained unchanged: to preserve the peace.145 The transformation of
the English legal concept of the King’s peace into a post-Revolutionary legal
concept consistent with republicanism did have implications for understanding
the limits on armed travel in public. In particular, the notion of traveling armed
as rebuke to the King’s majesty and authority no longer had any legal
significance. In a society in which the people were sovereign, the notion of the
peace was effectively republicanized. As a Connecticut guide for justices of the
peace observed, “the term peace, denotes the condition of the body politic in

140. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE 214
(1803).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. MD. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1776). See also William B. Stoebuck, Reception of English Common
Law in the American Colonies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393 (1968) (describing how the American
Colonies adopted the common law as the basis for judicial decisions).
144. 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 29–30 (Mitchell & Flanders eds., 1903).
145. As Laura Edwards demonstrates, the traditional English practice of using private prosecutions
for assault and similar crimes gradually gave way to a focus on public prosecution as an affront to the
people’s peace in the South. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL
CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH
(2009).
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which no person suffers, or has just cause to fear any injury.”146 The offense was
now one that harmed the body politic, not the King’s Majesty. Disturbing the
peace remained a serious legal matter, and Justices of the Peace continued to
exercise considerable power and authority, including a power to preempt
violence by imposing peace bonds, disarmament, or incarceration.
A number of states, including North Carolina, Virginia, and Massachusetts
expressly adopted their own versions of the Statute of Northampton.147 North
Carolina’s formulation of the prohibition followed closely on its English
predecessor. It declared that no person may “go nor ride armed by night nor by
day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the King’s Justices, or other
ministers, nor in no part elsewhere.”148 Virginia’s statute also drew on the original
English text, with one important change, noted by William Henig, a leading
lawyer in the state, who remarked that the legislature introduced additional due
process protections for those accused of violating the law. “The act of assembly
of Virginia materially differs from the act of parliament” he wrote, “being more
favorable to liberty.”149 In Virginia, a justice of the peace could not seize arms
and imprison an individual for more than a month. To impose a stiffer penalty
required a jury verdict, a higher due process standard, and hence a greater
safeguard for liberty.150
In 1795, Massachusetts enacted its own version of the Statute of Northampton
drawn from prior English commentators. The law forbade anyone who “shall ride
or go armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens of this
Commonwealth.”151 This was a common gloss on the Statute of Northampton
used in many of the popular English Justice of the Peace manuals of the previous
century. It framed the prohibition in terms of traveling with offensive weapons.
The criminal conduct did not require the demonstration of a modern style mens
rea; the mere act of traveling armed with offensive weapons demonstrated the
evil intent required by law.152

146. JOSEPH BACKUS, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 23 (1816).
147. See A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF A
PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 33 (1794) (prohibiting individuals from “
go[ing] or ride[ing] armed by night or day”); FRANCOIS XAVIER MARTIN, A COLLECTION OF STATUTES
OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 60–61 (1792)
(prohibiting conduct by individuals who “go nor ride armed by night nor by day”); FRANCOIS XAVIER
MARTIN, A TREATISE ON THE POWER AND DUTIES OF A CONSTABLE ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF
NORTH CAROLINA 9 (1806).
148. FRANÇOIS X. MARTIN, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND OF
SHERIFFS, CORONERS, &C. ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 84 (1804).
149. WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 50 (1810).
150. Id.
151. ASAHEL STEARNS & LEMUEL SHAW, THE GENERAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 454 (Theron
Metcalf ed., 1823).
152. See BINDER, supra note 20.
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IX
THE EMERGENCE OF OPPOSING MODELS OF THE RIGHT TO CARRY IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC
In the preface to his edition of Blackstone, St. George Tucker explained that
his project was inspired by the need to educate Americans about how the
common law had evolved in America. Tucker conceded that it would have been
an even more monumental undertaking to try to explicate how this process
differed from state to state, so he focused most of attention on his home state of
Virginia.153 Although it is tempting for modern scholars to treat Tucker as if his
writings were some type of proxy for an American legal mind, such an approach
distorts the fact that Tucker’s vision of law was not simply rooted in his
experiences as a Virginian, but also in his growing opposition to Federalist
constitutionalism. Tucker was an ardent Jeffersonian and any interpretation of
his thought that fails to acknowledge this fact is likely to distort his influence and
significance.154 Consider Tucker’s often quoted observation, written in response
to the prosecution of Fries’s Rebellion in Pennsylvania.155
But ought that circumstances of itself to create any such presumption in America, where
the right to bear arms is recognized and secured in the constitution itself. In many parts
of the United State, a man no more thinks, of going out of his house on any occasion,
without his rifle or musket in his hand, than an European fine gentleman without his
sword by his side.156

Tucker was commenting on a federal case that he believed had been decided
incorrectly, so it is odd that modern lawyers would treat his comment, and not
the federal court decision, as the legally authoritative source. Secondly, Tucker
did not claim that the situation in Virginia was universally recognized in all parts
of America, but was only true in some areas. Finally, Tucker was talking about a
musket, the standard weapon of the militia, and not about concealable weapons.
Justice Samuel Chase certainly did not share Tucker’s views and the successful
prosecution of the rebels in both the Whiskey Rebellion and Fries Rebellion later
in the decade suggests that Chase’s narrow Federalist view, not the more
expansive Jeffersonian view espoused by Tucker, was the legally dominant view
of federal courts at this moment in time.157 Tucker took exception to Federalist

153. TUCKER, supra note 140, at 1–9.
154. See Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The
Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013) (discussing the problem
of taking a single complex thinker such as Tucker and treating him as proxy for a monolithic American
Mind); Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original Understandings and
Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123 (2006) (explaining the need to root Tucker’s
constitutional thought, including his views of the Second Amendment, in the growing rift between
Federalists and Jeffersonians in the 1790s).
155. For gun rights misinterpretations of Tucker, see Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker’s
Second Amendment: Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty”, 3 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 120 (2006);
James Lindgren, Forward: The Past and Future of Guns, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 705 (2015).
156. TUCKER, supra note 140, at Appendix B.
157. PAUL DOUGLAS NEWMAN, FRIES’S REBELLION: THE ENDURING STRUGGLE FOR THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2004).
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Chase’s reliance on traditional English legal authorities, which was particularly
disturbing, given his fears that Federalists intended to use the common methods
and principles to expand federal power.158 In contrast to Chase and other
Federalists, Tucker believed that American law had not absorbed English
common law’s broad view of treason. Under English law, a group of armed men
traveling was at the very least a riotous assembly and depending on the
circumstance a potentially treasonous one. Tucker did not believe that this was
the case in Virginia and his often quoted comment about Virginian’s traveling
with their muskets should be placed in that broader context.
The fact that Tucker discerned a clear difference between Virginia and
Pennsylvania on this important point of law as early as the 1790s serves as a
reminder that the meaning of arms bearing was not static in the early American
republic, but evolving.159 Indeed, as the market revolution made cheap and
reliable hand guns more plentiful, the practice of carrying these weapons in
public grow at an alarming rate. It was this new practice of traveling with
concealed weapons that prompted the first wave of modern style gun control
measures in the South.160 Kentucky’s law was challenged and declared
unconstitutional in Bliss v. Commonwealth (1822).161 The court in Bliss took an
almost absolutist view of the right to bear arms, viewing any regulation as
tantamount to a destruction of the right.162 Elsewhere in the South, a permissive,
but less absolutist view took hold. A Richmond Grand Jury (1820) captured this
strain of southern thought when it published a statement attacking the dastardly
practice of concealed carry, but reiterated that open carry of arms was perfectly
legal and honorable. Although the Grand Jury opposed “any legislative
interference with what they conceive to be one of the most essential privileges of
freemen, the right of carrying arms” they were equally adamant about expressing
their “abhorrence of a practice which it becomes all good citizens to frown upon
with contempt, and to endeavor to suppress.” The cowardly “practice of carrying

158. The Jeffersonian opposition in the 1790s feared Federalists were attempting to use English legal
methods to expand the power of the Constitution by importing common law ideas, including those about
treason, see Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law
of Crimes in the Early Republic 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223 (1986).
159. See CORNELL, supra note 135.
160. Cf. ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR
THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 100–01 (1813) (“An Act to prevent persons in this
Commonwealth from wearing concealed Arms, except in certain cases” approved in 1813); ACTS PASSED
AT THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIRST LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 172–75 (1813)
(“An Act against carrying concealed weapons, and going armed in public places in an unnecessary
manner” approved in 1813); THE REVISED LAWS OF INDIANA, ADOPTED AND ENACTED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THEIR EIGHTH SESSION 79 (1824) (“An Act to prohibit the wearing of
Concealed Weapons” approved in 1820); ARK. REV. STAT. div. VIII, ch. 44 (1838); Act of Oct. 19, 1821,
ch. 13, 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 15. Early Indiana was settled by southerners which makes its situation similar
to that of other southern states. Nicole Etcheson, Manliness and the Political Culture of the Old
Northwest, 1790–1860, 15 J. EARLY REP. 59, 60 n.2 (1995).
161. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822).
162. Id.
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arms secreted, in cases where no personal attack can reasonably be
apprehended.”163
One of the most thoughtful discussions of how the common law tradition had
evolved in the South was Charles Humphreys’ Compendium of the Common Law
in force in Kentucky, which attempted to do for Kentucky what Tucker had done
for Virginia: analyze the way English law had been modified and adapted to
circumstances in Kentucky.164 Humphreys specifically took up the question of
how the state’s constitutional provisions on the right to bear arms, as interpreted
by the courts, had modified common law restrictions on “riding or going armed
with dangerous or unusual weapons.” Although Kentucky had not abandoned
this ancient concept, it had modified it to reflect the radically altered context and
legal situation in the American South. Determining whether one had violated the
peace meant one had to acknowledge that if “in this country the constitution
guaranties to all persons the right to bear arms; then it can only be a crime to
exercise this right in such a manner, as to terrify the people unnecessarily.”165
Interestingly, Humphreys implicitly acknowledged the traditional standard that
armed travel was a terror to the people, but he noted that in Kentucky that legal
bar had been raised, a heightened standard that he described as terrifying “the
people unnecessarily.”166 Yet, even Kentucky eventually backed away from this
extreme libertarian interpretation which was eventually rejected when Kentucky
revised its constitution in 1849; the new constitution included an express
provision that “the General Assembly may pass laws to prevent persons from
carrying concealed arms.”167
The distinctive Southern interpretation of the English common law crime of
affray was elaborated in State v. Huntley (1843).168 North Carolina’s highest
Court noted that “no man amongst us carries it [a gun] about with him, as one of
his every day accoutrements—as a part of his dress.” Yet, echoing the views of
Humphreys and other southern commentators, the court went on to observe that
it “is to be remembered that the carrying of a gun per se constitutes no offence.
For any lawful purpose—either of business or amusement—the citizen is at
perfect liberty to carry his gun.”169 Striking a note similar to Humphrey, the court
noted: “It is the wicked purpose—and the mischievous result—which essentially
constitute the crime. He shall not carry about this or any other weapon of death
to terrify and alarm, and in such manner as naturally will terrify and alarm, a
peaceful people.”170 State v. Huntley broke with traditional English common law
in two important respects. First, it implicitly recognized that in North Carolina,
163.
164.
(1822).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

On Wearing Concealed Arms, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 9, 1820).
CHARLES HUMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY
Id.
Id.
KY. CONST. art. III, § 25 (1850).
State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843).
Id.
Id.
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the range of legitimate uses of firearms was considerably broader than it had been
under common law, encompassing both “business or amusement.” The law still
required a legitimate purpose to carry arms, noting that one did not sport arms
daily in public, but it acknowledged by its choice of terms a considerable range
of legitimate activities. The case also reflected a more profound change in the
nature of criminal law. Under the traditional English common law view, the
necessary evil intent for a criminal act could be inferred from the prohibited act
itself. Huntley represents a more modern conception, one in which subjective
intent was necessary to establish the mens rea requirement which was an essential
element of a crime. Gun rights scholars, most notably David Kopel and Eugene
Volokh, have read Huntley’s modern-style mens rea requirement back into
English legal history, assuming that this requirement existed centuries before it
became a part of the law. Their failure to grasp their error follows from a more
basic flaw that historian David Hackett Fischer describes as the fallacy of tunnel
history.171 Writing about the history of the crime of affray without consulting any
of the standard accounts of the history of Anglo-American criminal law led Kopel
and Volokh to ignore the differences between early modern and modern criminal
law.172
The line of cases that led to Huntley represented one of two Southern
jurisprudential traditions regarding firearms. A different, more limited
conception of the right to keep and bear arms, one more consistent with the
traditional eighteenth century militia-based understanding of the right also
gained judicial notice in other parts of the South. This alternative vision was
elaborated in two cases, Aymette v. State and State v. Buzzard.173 In both of these
cases the meaning of the right to bear arms was shaped by the traditional civic
republican understanding of the militia. Such a conception was neither an
individual right in the modern sense, nor was it as narrowly framed as a right of
the states—the essence of the modern collective rights theory of the right to bear
arms.174 Laws that inhibited the ability of citizens to keep and bear those arms
needed to fulfill their militia obligation would have been unconstitutional.
Firearms with little or no value to the preservation of the militia, easily concealed
pocket pistols being a notable example, were treated as ordinary property and
subject to the full range of the state’s police powers, including in the case of some
especially dangerous weapons, prohibition. In Aymette, the court wrote: “The
legislature, therefore, have a right to prohibit the wearing, or keeping weapons

171. See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL
THOUGHT 142 (1970).
172. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 101 (erroneously asserting that “the Statute was understood by
the Framers as covering only those circumstances where carrying of arms was unusual and therefore
terrifying.”); David Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
(2016) (confusing the jury’s act of nullification of the statute with the judge’s views and ignoring the fact
that the judges imposed a peace bond for a violation of the Statute of Northampton).
173. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842).
174. For an overview of the modern individual rights and collective rights theories of the Second
Amendment, see THE SECOND AMENDMENT ON TRIAL, supra note 5.
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dangerous to the peace and safety of the citizens, and which are not usual in
civilized warfare, or would not contribute to the common defence.”175
Given that modern law is dominated by the discourse of rights, it has been
difficult for gun rights scholars to make the imaginative leap of faith necessary to
understand how the right to bear arms could be anything other than an individual
right of self-defense.176 To understand the Second Amendment one must grasp
the fears that animated it: the disarmament of the militia. Although modern
Americans fear “black helicopters” and government agents coming to take their
guns away, the Founding generation recognized that indifference and debt posed
at least as great a danger to militia armament as direct government action. In
particular, debt was a pervasive feature of economic life in the agricultural
communities of early America. Farmers were dependent on borrowing money
until crops were sold at market and loans might be repaid.177 Protecting privately
owned militia weapons from seizure in lawsuits was of paramount importance in
making sure that the militia would not simply disarm itself as citizens sold off
muskets to pay their debts. In virtually every state, militia laws protected
175. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840). Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second
Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for SelfDefense, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 585 (2012) typifies the gun rights misreading of this tradition. O’Shea offers
no explanation of why a common law right of self-defense and a civic constitutional right could not have
existed separately from one another. Instead, he simply assumes that rights embedded in the Bill of
Rights have always been treated the same at all times and places in American history, a dubious historical
proposition with little factual bais. “Why not the hybrid view of the right, which combines a militia
purpose with a personal guarantee against disarmament, thereby treating the Second Amendment ‘right
of the people’ in the same way the other rights of the people in the Bill of Rights have been treated?”
For a critique of this type of ahistorical approach to eighteenth century rights, see Cornell, Meaning and
Understanding, supra note 154.
176. On the difficulty of conceptualizing bearing arms outside of the modern rights discourse, see
Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014). For examples of gun rights scholars who
have trouble understanding that “the past is a foreign country,” DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A
FOREIGN COUNTRY (1985), in which conceptions of rights might not function in the same way as they
do in contemporary law, see Nicholas J. Johnson, Rights Versus Duties, History Department Lawyering,
and the Incoherence of Justice Stevens’s Heller Dissent, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1503 (2012) (arguing
anachronistically that the idea that rights might impose duties makes no sense because modern
conceptions of rights do not impose obligations on citizens) and Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 259 (2004)
(reviewing H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW
THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)) (finding it hard to accept that the Pennsylvanians
would have not constitutionalized the individual right of self-defense). Barnett’s error stems from his
failure to grasp the nature of the English common law context. For a corrective that shows that Heller’s
individual right is better understood as a traditional English common law right, not a Second Amendment
claim, see Reva Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1415 (2009)
(“[T]here is more evidence in the majority opinion establishing the existence of a common law right of
self-defense than there is demonstrating that such a right was constitutionalized by the Second
Amendment’s eighteenth-century ratifiers.”).
177. On the role of debt in Founding era culture, see T.H. BREEN, TOBACCO CULTURE: THE
MENTALITY OF THE GREAT TIDEWATER PLANTERS ON THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 31–32 (1985);
WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA 61–62 (1999); Emory G. Evans, Planter Indebtedness and the
Coming of the Revolution in Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 511 (1962). See also Kevin Sweeney,
Amendment, supra note 132.
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privately owned guns from seizure in debt proceedings or sale for failure to pay
taxes.178 In practical terms, these types of protections were of enormous
significance. Indeed, during the ratification debate, Anti-Federalists repeatedly
stressed that the federal government’s power of the purse, particularly onerous
taxation, was nearly as dangerous as its control of the military. Had legal
protections for privately owned militia arms not existed, this Anti-Federalist fear
might have easily come to pass: the state militias might have been disarmed
without government taking any direct action. Simply by raising taxes,
government could induce debt-ridden farmers to disarm themselves by selling off
militia weapons.179
In the antebellum South two different models of arms bearing emerged and
each had profound consequences for the scope of government regulation of
armed travel in public. A more libertarian gun rights tradition exemplified by
cases such as Bliss, Nunn, and Huntley emerged in parts of the Slave South that
vindicated a robust right to travel armed in public. Bans on concealed weapons
were permissible, but only if open carry was available. A different, more
restricted model also emerged that carried forward a distinctly eighteenth
century civic republican vision of arms bearing. In Aymette and Buzzard, guns
related to militia purposes were given full constitutional protection. Other
weapons were subject to the full authority of the state’s police power.180
Legal scholarship prior to Heller naturally focused considerable attention on
antebellum case law, a fact reflected in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion which
looked to this tradition to understand the scope of Second Amendment rights in
the decades after its adoption.181 The fact that this jurisprudential tradition was
unique to the slave South did not spark much scholarly interest at that time and
accordingly did not receive any judicial notice in Heller. More recent scholarship
by contrast has been directed by Scalia’s injunction to look more closely at the
history of regulation for guidance.182 Among the most important discoveries of
this new body of scholarship is the importance of local and regional variation in
the regulatory tradition that emerged after the adoption of the Second
Amendment. This profound localism and regionalism was effectively invisible to
the Heller court, which erroneously assumed that the Southern tradition
embodied in the extant case law was representative of broader American legal
attitudes in the Founding era and early republic. In fact, the Southern libertarian

178. Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths
from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1708–09 (2012).
179. See CORNELL, supra note 135 and Sweeney, supra note 132.
180. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 619–21 (2008). For two leading late nineteenth
century commentators who argued that Buzzard, not Bliss was the ascendant paradigm in American law,
see JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (1868) and John Foster Dillon,
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and Private Defense, 1 CENT. L.J. 259 (1874).
181. Heller, 554 U.S. at 610–14.
182. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013) and Eric M. Ruben & Saul
Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125
YALE L.J. FORUM 121 (2015).
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tradition of permissive carry was exceptional. Outside of the slave South, a
different and more restrictive tradition of public carry had emerged.183
The foundation for this alternative tradition was the version of the Statute of
Northampton enacted by Massachusetts in 1795. Rather than draw on the text of
the Parliamentary statute itself, the Massachusetts legislature adopted a gloss
that had become popular in many of the justice of the peace manuals.
Massachusetts framed its prohibition on public carry in robust terms: It outlawed
anyone who “shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear or terror of the good
citizens of this Commonwealth.”184 A New Jersey justice of the peace manual
published a decade after the Massachusetts statute used the same language
regarding bans on traveling “armed offensively.”185 The guide elaborated on what
this prohibition meant, describing the considerable powers enjoyed by peace
officers to preserve the peace. “So a Justice of the Peace may, in his own
discretion, require sureties for the peace from one who shall go or ride armed
offensively to the terror of the people, though they he may not have threatened
any person in particular, or committed any particular act of violence.”186 As one
Connecticut justice of the peace manual made clear, it was not simply breaches
of the peace, but even an “inchoate breach” such as traveling “offensively armed”
or with “an unusual number of attendants” that ran afoul of the law. In a
comprehensive overview of the “common law, the statute Laws of Massachusetts,
and of the United States,” the powers of the justice of the peace to detain and
arrest those who traveled with offensive weapons, was listed as a separate
category from such other crimes affray, riot, and disturbing the peace.187 In 1835,
Massachusetts revised its public carry law. The new Massachusetts statute
prohibited armed travel, but it recognized an exception in cases where a person
had a reasonable cause to fear imminent violence.188
If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or
violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may on complaint of any person
having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be required to find
sureties for keeping the peace. . . .189

183. See Ruben & Cornell, supra note 182.
184. THE PERPETUAL LAWS, OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTION TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL COURT, IN 1798
259 (Isaiah Thomas ed., 1799).
185. JAMES EWING, A TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE,
SHERIFF, CORONER, CONSTABLE 546 (1805).
186. Id.
187. See JOSEPH BACKUS, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 23–24 (1816).
188. 1836 Mass. Acts 750.
189. Id.
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One of the state’s most distinguished jurists, Peter Oxenbridge Thacher,
offered this gloss on the new law:
In our own Commonwealth, no person may go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol,
or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend an
assault or violence to his person, family, or property.190

A contemporary newspaper writer saw the new law in similar terms, using it
as a jumping off point to explore the scope of the state’s police powers. After
noting that there was nothing unconstitutional about laws prohibiting the
discharge of weapons “in cities and populous towns,” the article went on to
observe that the legislature saw fit to go even further: “have not our legislature
forbidden, and ought not every legislature” the dangerous practice of traveling
“armed with pistols, swords, daggers, bowie-knives or other offensive and
dangerous weapons.”191 The power to prohibit such weapons followed naturally
from the state’s police power. Indeed, it was an argument “unfounded and
alarming” to claim that a state had the power to punish crimes, but could do
nothing to prevent them.192
In the decades following the adoption of the Massachusetts model of
restrictive public carry states and localities across the nation used it as a model
for enacting limits on public carry.193 The constitutionality of such statutes came

190. PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF
SUFFOLK, FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF THE TERMS OF THE
MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A.D. 1836 AND ON
MONDAY, MARCH 13TH, A.D. 27 (1837); see also Judge Thacher’s Charges, C HRISTIAN R EG . & B OS .
O BSERVER 91 (1837) (excerpting and reprinting the section of the grand jury charge dealing with
traveling armed).
191. An Address, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1838.
192. Id.
193. See 19 DEL. LAWS 733 (1852) (“Any justice of the peace may also cause to be arrested . . . all
who go armed offensively to the terror of the people, or are otherwise disorderly and dangerous.”); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 12 § 16 (1840) (“Any person, going armed with any dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other
offensive and dangerous weapon, without a reasonable cause to fear an assault on himself . . .”); MICH.
REV. STAT. ch. 162, § 16, reprinted in THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 690, 692
(1846) (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous
weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his
family or property, he may, on complaint of any person having reasonable cause to fear an injury or
breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the peace, for a term not exceeding six
months, with the right of appealing as before provided.”); Of Proceedings to Prevent the Commission of
Crimes, ch. 14, § 16, 1847 VA. ACTS 127, 129 (“If any person shall go armed with any offensive or
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or violence to his person,
or to his family or property, he may be required to find sureties for keeping the peace for a term not
exceeding twelve months, with the right of appealing as before provided”); 1870 W. VA. LAWS 702, 703,
ch. 153, § 8 (“If any person go armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to
fear violence to his person, family, or property, he may be required to give a recognizance, with the right
of appeal, as before provided, and like proceedings shall be had on such appeal.”); REVISED STATUTES
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, TO THE YEAR OF OUR LORD ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-TWO 333 (1852) (“Any justice of the peace may also cause to be arrested . . . all who go armed
offensively to the terror of the people, or are otherwise disorderly and dangerous.”); THE REVISED CODE
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PREPARED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS
570 (1857) (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his
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before the Texas Supreme Court in English v. State (1872).194 In response to
widespread violence, including targeted violence against Freedmen, a
Republican-led Texas legislature enacted a statute based on the 1835
Massachusetts model.195 The Republican-controlled Texas Supreme Court
upheld the law, noting that such laws were “not peculiar to our own State,” but
had become common: “It is safe to say that almost, if not every one of the States
of this union have a similar law upon their statute books, and, indeed, so far as
we have been able to examine them, they are more rigorous than the act under
consideration.”196 Although the Texas arms-bearing provision recognized a right
to regulate the scope of the right, the court did not think the power the legislature
had exercised extraordinary, but rather saw it as a basic exercise of the state’s
police powers.197 “The powers of government are intended to operate upon the
civil conduct of the citizen; and whenever his conduct becomes such as to offend
against public morals or public decency, it comes within the range of legislative
authority.”198 Two years later, a new court dominated by Democrats opposed to
Reconstruction took up a series of cases on the right to carry.199 In contrast to the
earlier court composed of Republicans, the new Democrat-dominated court took
a more expansive view of the right to bear arms, one close in spirit to Heller’s
individual rights model. One point of commonality between the courts was the
person . . . .”); THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN: PASSED AT THE ANNUAL
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE COMMENCING JANUARY 13, 1858, AND APPROVED MAY 17, 1858 985
(1858) (“If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and
dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his
person . . . .”); THE STATUTES OF OREGON: ENACTED AND CONTINUED IN FORCE BY THE
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, AT THE SESSION COMMENCING 5TH DECEMBER, 1853 220 (1854) (“If any
person shall go armed with dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without
reasonable cause to fear an assault, injury, or other violence to his person, or to his family or property,
he may, on complaint of any other person, having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the
peace, be required to find sureties for keeping the peace for a term not exceeding six months, with the
right of appealing as before provided.”); JOHN PURDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA,
FROM THE YEAR ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TO THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF MAY, ONE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SIXTY-ONE 250 (9th ed. 1862) (“If any person, not being an officer
on duty in the military or naval service of the state or of the United States, shall go armed with a dirk,
dagger, sword or pistol, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an
assault or other injury or violence . . . .”); GEORGE B. YOUNG, THE GENERAL STATUTES OF THE STATE
OF MINNESOTA, AS AMENDED BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED
ALL GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE IN FORCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE LEGISLATIVE SESSION OF 1878
629 (1879) (“Whoever goes armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive and
dangerous weapons, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his
person . . . .”).
194. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871).
195. Mark Anthony Frassetto, The Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas
4 TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2810806,
[https://perma.cc/MDM8-MAJG] (analyzing Republican and Democratic views of gun regulation in
Reconstruction era Texas).
196. Id.
197. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I § 13 (“Every person shall have the right to keep and bear arms, in
the lawful defense of himself or the State, under such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe.”).
198. English, 35 Tex. 473.
199. See Frasetto, supra note 195.
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view that as long as the law allowed for a self-defense exception for cases of
imminent threat, the prohibition on public carry was legal.200
Finally, even more sweeping bans on public carry were enacted in parts of the
West. In some instances such laws were enacted at the state level and in other
cases local communities passed ordinances limiting public carry.201 Thus, by the
end of the nineteenth century there were multiple models for dealing with the
issue of public carry. The permissive Southern model developed in the
antebellum slave South did not have much appeal to Americans in the post- Civil
War era.
Additional evidence that America had not embraced the permissive Southern
model may be found in a comprehensive overview of the laws pertaining to public
carry published in The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, an influential
and popular legal reference work published at the end of the nineteenth
century.202 The Encyclopedia includes a detailed entry on the laws covering
carrying firearms in public. It noted that “[t]he statutes of some of the States have
made it an offence to carry weapons concealed about the body, while others
prohibit the simple carrying of weapons, whether they are concealed or not. Such
statutes have been held not to conflict with the constitutional right of the people
of the United States to keep and bear arms.”203 The contributors explained that
American law recognized both a permissive and restrictive approach to carry.
The repeated claim made by gun rights advocates and others that there was
a widely recognized right of open carry in the nineteenth century is demonstrably
false. To the extent that such a right did exist it reflected a regional, not a national
200. See State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1874).
201. On restrictions in the “wild west,” see Dodge City, Kan., Ordinance No. 16, § XI (Sept. 22, 1876)
and 1876 WYO. COMP. LAWS 52, § 1 (prohibiting anyone from “bear[ing] upon his person, concealed or
openly, any fire arm or other deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village.”) For robust
local laws, see Ordinances of the Council of the City of Dallas and Annual Reports of City Officers from
October 1st, 1886 to June 25th, 1888 (that if any person in the City of Dallas shall carry on or about his
person, saddle, or in his saddle-bags, any pistol, dirk, dagger, slungshot, sword- cane, spear, or knuckles
made of any metal or hard substance, bowie knife, or any other kind of knife manufactured or sold for
purposes of offense or defense, he shall be punished by fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than
two hundred dollars and shall be confined in the city prison not less than twenty nor more than sixty
days.). THEODORE HARRIS, CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO COMPRISING
ALL ORDINANCES OF A GENERAL CHARACTER IN FORCE AUGUST 7TH, 1899 (“If any person, within
the corporate limits of the city of San Antonio, shall carry on or about his or her person, saddle, or in his
saddle bags, any pistol, dirk, dagger, sling shot, sword cane, spear, or knuckles made of any metal or any
hard substance, bowie knife, or any other kind of knife manufactured or sold for purposes of offense or
defense, he or she shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than
two hundred dollars ($200.00).”). Pueblo Colorado, Ordinances, Section Six, art. II, ch. 8 (“ If any person
other than a law officer shall carry upon his person any loaded pistol, or other deadly weapon, he shall
upon conviction be fined not less than fifteen nor more than fifty dollars for each offense, and in addition
thereto forfeit to the city any weapon found on his person.”)
202. Review American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 29 CENTRAL L.J. 400 (1896).
203. THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 408 (1887). It addressed both relevant
state case law and noted that the Second Amendment had not been incorporated. For the rejection of
Second Amendment incorporation in the nineteenth century, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875). In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Second Amendment was held to apply to the states.
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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norm. Similarly, the notion that states are prohibited from requiring a reason to
travel armed is also historically false. Many states followed Massachusetts and
restricted such a right to situations in which individuals had a reasonable fear of
imminent threat. If one follows Heller’s rule and looks at the historical record in
an impartial and scholarly manner, the gun rights mythology about the right to
carry turns out to reflect a partial account of the historical record. As the detailed
treatment of this issue in the American and English Encyclopedia of Law makes
clear, the notion of limiting public carry was an uncontroversial proposition at
the end of the nineteenth century.204
IX
CONCLUSION
A systematic survey of popular guides to the law aimed at justices of the
peace, constables, and other peace officers provides an excellent set of sources
for exploring how the concepts of self-defense, the right to keep or travel with
arms, and the need to balance these claims against the preservation of the peace
evolved in the more than two centuries following the Glorious Revolution.
Scholarship written before Heller offered a static and flawed account of the scope
of the English right to keep and travel with arms. The actual history of this preexisting English right and its evolution under American law is both fascinating
and far more complex than either side in the modern debate over gun rights or
gun violence prevention have realized. In parts of the American South, a more
expansive conception of the right to travel armed emerged. Outside of the South,
a more restrictive attitude toward armed travel took hold. By the end of the
nineteenth century the more restrictive model was ascendant, but traces of the
Southern model continued to exist.
The dispute between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer over balancing may
have been misplaced. The notion that the right of self-defense had to be balanced
against the necessity to keep the peace was central to the way the common law
dealt with arms. Preserving liberty while protecting the peace is not some modern
imposition sprung from the head of modern activist jurists. It is the fundamental
guiding principle at the root of Anglo-American law in this area and has always
defined the way legislators, justices of the peace, and judges approach the
regulation of arms. Perhaps the least appreciated part of the text of the Second
Amendment is the clause that asserts the goal of promoting the “security of a free
state.” Policies that undermine that security are clearly not consistent with the
Amendment’s purpose. A variety of regulations on the right to keep and bear
arms are not only permissible, but are in some sense essential to harmonize the
two parts of the Amendment. The long history of common law restrictions only
underscore this basic point.

204. See Kopel supra note 111; O’Shea, supra note 155; Volokh, supra note 20.
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